Mexico does not tether its claims to alleged statutory breaches.

— Justice Jackson in SMITH & WESSON BRANDS, INC. v. ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS

— with tether (and with her signature metaphorical precision), suggesting a deliberate, necessary attachment and making that connection’s absence feel like a structural flaw

The dissent exudes a sense that Texas and Fasken have been treated unfairly.

— Justice Kavanaugh in NRC v. TEXAS

— with exudes, elevating the description for a subtle implication

In attempting to collapse the latter order into his final order of removal, Monsalvo wrongly attempts to revive the pre-IIRIRA approach.

— Justice Thomas (dissenting) in MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI

— adding vigor with collapse and revive to capture a complex procedural history and subtly signaling that the move is misguided

The three-Justice opinion rattles off the public criticisms that supposedly spurred Congress to reform the practice of §924(c) sentence “stacking.”

— Justice Alito (dissenting) in HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

— showing how the right verb, rattles off, conveys speed and skepticism to undercut the authority of the other opinion

And Mr. Bucklew sought to intervene in yet another lawsuit alleging that Missouri’s protocol violated the Eighth Amendment because unqualified personnel might botch its administration.

Justice Gorsuch in BUCKLEW v. PRECYTHE

— with botch, putting forth error and informality and capturing the concern without legal jargon or over-explanation

Transform offers two creative retorts, neither of which excavates a clear statement from §363(m)’s unassuming text.

— Justice Jackson in MOAC MALL HOLDINGS LLC v. TRANSFORM HOLDCO LLC

— with ecavates, adding energy and imagery to what could be a dry statutory interpretation, with a hint of edginess

While the hospital may have a wholly sincere, Christ-centered mission, its religious motivation has little if anything to do with whether adjudicating unemployment claims from this hospital’s laid-off workers will entangle church and state.

— Justice Jackson (dissenting) in BUFKIN v. COLLINS

— with entangle, suggesting that the relationship between church and state would become messy, intrusive, and improperly intertwined while also capturing complexity, risk, and boundary-crossing

What the majority misses in its effort to shoehorn §5107(b)’s approximate-balance inquiry into the question-of-fact category is the true nature of that assessment, as well as the fact that making the approximate-balance determination is more nuanced than simply weighing the evidence on hand.

— Justice Jackson (dissenting) in BUFKIN v. COLLINS

— with shoehorn, conveying forced, awkward reasoning and implying the majority is cramming something into a category where it doesn’t belong

But even if Congress implicitly wanted §924(c)(1)’s sentencing enhancements to reach cause-and-result crimes that are committed by act and cause bodily harm, there is no reason to suppose Congress wanted us to mangle §924(c)(3)(A) to get the job done.

— Justice Gorsuch (dissenting) in DELLIGATTI v. UNITED STATES

— with the vivid and slightly brutal mangle, conveying legal distortion with emotional clarity and punch and not shying away from charged language