Supreme Court examples of strong verbs

  • Mexico does not tether its claims to alleged statutory breaches.

    — Justice Jackson (concurring) in SMITH & WESSON BRANDS, INC. v. ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS

    — with tether (and her signature metaphorical precision), suggesting a deliberate, necessary attachment, and making the absence of that connection feel like a structural flaw

  • The dissent exudes a sense that Texas and Fasken have been treated unfairly.

    — Justice Kavanaugh in NRC v. TEXAS

    — with exudes, elevating the description for a subtle implication

  • In attempting to collapse the latter order into his final order of removal, Monsalvo wrongly attempts to revive the pre-IIRIRA approach.

    — Justice Thomas (dissenting) in MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI

    — adding vigor with collapse and revive to capture a complex procedural history and subtly signaling that the move is misguided

  • The three-Justice opinion rattles off the public criticisms that supposedly spurred Congress to reform the practice of §924(c) sentence “stacking.”

    — Justice Alito (dissenting) in HEWITT v. UNITED STATES

    — showing how the right verb, rattles off, conveys speed and skepticism to undercut the authority of the other opinion

  • And Mr. Bucklew sought to intervene in yet another lawsuit alleging that Missouri’s protocol violated the Eighth Amendment because unqualified personnel might botch its administration.

    Justice Gorsuch in BUCKLEW v. PRECYTHE

    — with botch, putting forth error and informality and capturing the concern without legal jargon or over-explanation

  • Transform offers two creative retorts, neither of which excavates a clear statement from §363(m)’s unassuming text.

    — Justice Jackson in MOAC MALL HOLDINGS LLC v. TRANSFORM HOLDCO LLC

    — with excavates, adding energy and imagery to what could be a dry statutory interpretation, with a hint of edginess

  • While the hospital may have a wholly sincere, Christ-centered mission, its religious motivation has little if anything to do with whether adjudicating unemployment claims from this hospital’s laid-off workers will entangle church and state.

    — Justice Jackson (concurring) in CATHOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN LABOR & INDUSTRY REVIEW COMM’N

    — with entangle, suggesting that the relationship between church and state would become messy, intrusive, and improperly intertwined while also capturing complexity, risk, and boundary-crossing

  • What the majority misses in its effort to shoehorn §5107(b)’s approximate-balance inquiry into the question-of-fact category is the true nature of that assessment, as well as the fact that making the approximate-balance determination is more nuanced than simply weighing the evidence on hand.

    — Justice Jackson (dissenting) in BUFKIN v. COLLINS

    — with shoehorn, conveying forced, awkward reasoning and implying the majority’s reasoning is ill-fitting

  • But even if Congress implicitly wanted §924(c)(1)’s sentencing enhancements to reach cause-and-result crimes that are committed by act and cause bodily harm, there is no reason to suppose Congress wanted us to mangle §924(c)(3)(A) to get the job done.

    — Justice Gorsuch (dissenting) in DELLIGATTI v. UNITED STATES

    — with the vivid and slightly brutal mangle, conveying legal distortion with emotional clarity and punch and not shying away from charged language

  • The majority, however, delights to do justice by piecemeal. Its decision to strip the federal courts of the authority to issue universal injunctions of even flagrantly unlawful Government action represents a grave and unsupported diminution of the judicial power of equity.

    — Justice Sotomayor (dissenting) in TRUMP v. CASA, INC.

    — with delights and strip, adding voice and edge to a powerful critique

  • Moreover, the allegation that the relevant discriminatory act took place while she was still on the job tees up the question we did grant certiorari to address: “Under the [ADA], does a former employee— who was qualified to perform her job and who earned postemployment benefits while employed—lose her right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefits solely because she no longer holds her job?”

    — Justice Jackson (dissenting) in STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD

    — with the vivid and modern tees up, adding energy to a complex legal setup

  • That decision guts our free exercise precedent and strikes at the core premise of public schools: that children may come together to learn not the teachings of a particular faith, but a range of concepts and views that reflect our entire society.

    — Justice Sotomayor (dissenting) in MAHMOUD v. TAYLOR

    — with guts, conveying forceful destruction (not just disagreement) and a ripping out of something essential