We saw “no basis in text or prior practice for limiting the latter phrase” to the single person who engaged in protected conduct. Ibid. So too here.

— Justice Barrett in FDA v. R.J. REYNOLDS VAPOR CO.

— using a creative comparison transition (and a favorite Court fragment)

How the Court might reject the first request and indulge the second poses quite the puzzle.

— Justice Gorsuch (dissenting) in DELLIGATTI v. UNITED STATES

— adding flair with the compact and stylish qualifier quite

Taking “due account” of a rule is not literally the same as applying that rule lock, stock, and barrel.

— Justice Alito in FDA v. WAGES AND WHITE LION INVESTMENTS, LLC

— showing one of the very few times the justices use literally—and always in its true, literal sense

There are other possibilities too: For instance, perhaps Smothermon was confused by references to “Dr. Trumpet” and lithium but never investigated the issue further.

— Justice Barrett (concurring and dissenting) in GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

— keeping up momentum with the transition For instance after a colon and softening the point with perhaps

But that slender (and somewhat backhanded) dictum cannot make us stop in our tracks.

— Justice Kagan in ROYAL CANIN U.S.A., INC. v. WULLSCHLEGER

— using the Court’s most popular and speediest transition But followed by the apt qualifiers slender and somewhat to add nuance with short additions to an already short sentence

Here, in contrast, no nationwide factor all but settles EPA’s ultimate decisions. Instead, EPA disapproved Oklahoma’s and Utah’s SIPs after conducting predominantly fact-intensive, state-specific analysis.

— Justice Thomas in OKLAHOMA v. EPA

— depicting the power of word choice with the transitions: Here, in contrast, and Instead, in addition to qualifiers: all but, predominantly, state-specific, fact-intensive

For one, the statute nowhere says that a “weapon” must have a fully functional frame or receiver—nor is it obvious how we might derive such a rule from its terms. In fact, as we have seen, subsection (A) reaches any “weapon” that may “readily be converted” to live fire. §921(a)(3)(A). And a gun that is fully operable, save for a frame missing a single and easily-added screw, would surely fit that description.

— Justice Gorsuch in BONDI v. VANDERSTOK

— expertly guiding the reader with the transitions: For one, nor, In fact, and And, along with the intensifiers: fully and surely

Congress nevertheless enacted the Second Hickenlooper Amendment with those observations in mind, and later passed the expropriation exception, which has language nearly identical to that of the Second Hickenlooper Amendment.

— Justice Sotomayor in REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY v. SIMON

— making complicated language flow with the transition nevertheless and the qualifier nearly; consider how the meaning would change without these words (or with different ones)

As the dispute comes to us, it presents three questions. First, did Congress violate the Constitution by delegating to the FCC the power to tax? Second, did the FCC violate the Constitution by subdelegating some of its authority to the private Administrative Company? And third, even if neither of those features independently offends the Constitution, does their combination?

— Justice Gorsuch in BONDI v. VANDERSTOK

— using the familiar transitions First, Second, and Third to add a rhythmically satisfying organization that lets the reader anticipate the argment to come