They do not rely on four distinct administrative-law principles; rather, their arguments before this Court rest primarily on the FDA’s supposed change in position regarding application requirements

— Justice Alito in FDA v. WAGES AND WHITE LION INVESTMENTS, LLC

— placing “primarily” right next to “rest,” the verb it modifies so no confusion can arise

Importantly, the relevant question for purposes of our jurisdiction is whether, at the time this Court was called upon to intervene, the District Court’s inaction had the effect of refusing an injunction.

— Per curiam in A.A.R.P. v. TRUMP

— “Importantly” modifies the entire statement

— “for purposes of our jurisdiction” modifies “question”

— “at the time this Court was called upon . . .” modifies “whether”

The TCA itself imposes only basic requirements on this matter.

— Justice Alito in FDA v. WAGES AND WHITE LION INVESTMENTS, LLC

— placing “only” right next to “basic” makes the meaning clear; the meaning changes with variations:

— “Only the TCA itself . . . .”

— “The TCA itself only imposes. . . .”

— “basic requirements only on this matter.”

Having blithely dispensed with the notion that SB1 classifies on the basis of sex, the majority next asserts that “SB1 does not classify on the basis of transgender status.”

— Justice Sotomayor (dissenting) in UNITED STATES v. SKRMETTI

— placing the modifier “[h]aving blithely dispensed” immediately before its logical subject, “the majority,” avoiding a dangling modifier

Considering that this testimony held no significance for any contested issue at trial, in this environment there is no reason to think its correction would have been noteworthy, much less the voilà moment the majority imagines.

— Justice Thomas (dissenting) in GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

— implying through context that Justice Thomas is “[c]onsidering,” but grammatically, the modifier dangles

The driver had sped away from a traffic stop on a well-used road, and tried to outrun as many as six police cruisers at speeds sometimes exceeding 100 miles per hour.

— Justice Kagan in BARNES v. FELIX

— clearly placing three modifiers exactly next to what they modify: (1) “on a well-used road” modifies “traffic stop”; (2) “as many as” modifies “six”; (3) “sometimes exceeding 100 miles per hour” modifies “speeds”

And a “reasonable accommodation,” the ADA provides, refers to things like “job restructuring,” modifying “existing facilities used by employees,” and altering “training materials or policies.”

— Justice Gorsuch in STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD

— describing one of many instances where the Court must interpret the meaning of a modifying phrase

The last-antecedent rule instructs that the correct antecedent is usually “the nearest reasonable” one. Ibid. And Boechler links “such matter” to the phrase immediately preceding the jurisdictional parenthetical, while the Commissioner stretches back one phrase more.

— Justice Barrett in BOECHLER v. COMMISSIONER

— describing one of the more complicated modifier rules: “the rule of the last antecedent”

But it is very easy to think of sentences that clearly go against the canon: “At the Super Bowl party, she ate, drank, and cheered raucously.” “On Saturday, he relaxes and exercises vigorously.”

— Justice Alito (concurring) in FACEBOOK, INC. v. DUGUID

— offering examples of where the rule of the last antecedent does not apply