Supreme Court examples of modifiers

  • They do not rely on four distinct administrative-law principles; rather, their arguments before this Court rest primarily on the FDA’s supposed change in position regarding application requirements.

    — Justice Alito in FDA v. WAGES AND WHITE LION INVESTMENTS, LLC

    — placing “primarily” right next to “rest,” the verb it modifies so no confusion can arise

  • Importantly, the relevant question for purposes of our jurisdiction is whether, at the time this Court was called upon to intervene, the District Court’s inaction had the effect of refusing an injunction.

    — Per curiam in A.A.R.P. v. TRUMP

    — “Importantly” modifies the entire statement

    — “for purposes of our jurisdiction” modifies “question”

    — “at the time this Court was called upon” modifies “whether”

  • The TCA itself imposes only basic requirements on this matter.

    — Justice Alito in FDA v. WAGES AND WHITE LION INVESTMENTS, LLC

    — placing “only” next to “basic” makes the meaning clear; consider how the meaning changes with variations:

    — “Only the TCA itself . . . .”

    — “The TCA itself only imposes . . . .”

    — “basic requirements only on this matter.”

  • Having blithely dispensed with the notion that SB1 classifies on the basis of sex, the majority next asserts that “SB1 does not classify on the basis of transgender status.”

    — Justice Sotomayor (dissenting) in UNITED STATES v. SKRMETTI

    — placing the modifier “[h]aving blithely dispensed” immediately before its logical subject, “the majority,” avoiding a dangling modifier

  • Considering that this testimony held no significance for any contested issue at trial, in this environment there is no reason to think its correction would have been noteworthy, much less the voilà moment the majority imagines.

    — Justice Thomas (dissenting) in GLOSSIP v. OKLAHOMA

    — implying through context that the author is doing the “[c]onsidering,” but grammatically, the modifier dangles

  • The driver had sped away from a traffic stop on a well-used road, and tried to outrun as many as six police cruisers at speeds sometimes exceeding 100 miles per hour.

    — Justice Kagan in BARNES v. FELIX

    — clearly placing three modifiers exactly next to what they modify: (1) “on a well-used road” modifies “traffic stop”; (2) “as many as” modifies “six”; (3) “sometimes exceeding 100 miles per hour” modifies “speeds”

  • And a “reasonable accommodation,” the ADA provides, refers to things like “job restructuring,” modifying “existing facilities used by employees,” and altering “training materials or policies.”

    — Justice Gorsuch in STANLEY v. CITY OF SANFORD

    — describing one of many instances where the Court must interpret the meaning of a modifying phrase, this time in the American Disabilities Act

  • The last-antecedent rule instructs that the correct antecedent is usually “the nearest reasonable” one. And Boechler links “such matter” to the phrase immediately preceding the jurisdictional parenthetical, while the Commissioner stretches back one phrase more.

    — Justice Barrett in BOECHLER v. COMMISSIONER

    — describing one of the more complicated modifier rules: “the rule of the last antecedent”

  • But it is very easy to think of sentences that clearly go against the canon: “At the Super Bowl party, she ate, drank, and cheered raucously.” “On Saturday, he relaxes and exercises vigorously.”

    — Justice Alito (concurring) in FACEBOOK, INC. v. DUGUID

    — offering exceptions to the last-antecedent rule (which would apply the adverbs “raucously” and “vigorously” to all preceding verbs); here, it makes sense to apply those adverbs only to the final verb

Justice Kagan, dissenting in Lockhart v. United States, explains the rule of the last antecedent:

Imagine a friend told you that she hoped to meet “an actor, director, or producer involved with the new Star Wars movie.” You would know immediately that she wanted to meet an actor from the Star Wars cast—not an actor in, for example, the latest Zoolander. Suppose a real estate agent promised to find a client “a house, condo, or apartment in New York.” Wouldn’t the potential buyer be annoyed if the agent sent him information about condos in Maryland or California? And consider a law imposing a penalty for the “violation of any statute, rule, or regulation relating to insider trading.” Surely a person would have cause to protest if punished under that provision for violating a traffic statute. The reason in all three cases is the same: Everyone understands that the modifying phrase—“involved with the new Star Wars movie,” “in New York,” “relating to insider trading”—applies to each term in the preceding list, not just the last.

That ordinary understanding of how English works, in speech and writing alike, should decide this case. Avondale Lockhart is subject to a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence for possessing child pornography if, but only if, he has a prior state-law conviction for “aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” 18 U. S. C. §2252(b)(2). The Court today, relying on what is called the “rule of the last antecedent,” reads the phrase “involving a minor or ward” as modifying only the final term in that three-item list. But properly read, the modifier applies to each of the terms—just as in the examples above. . . . (For her full dissent, click here.)