That kind of self-help on the way to reversing precedent has become almost routine at this Court. Stop applying a decision where one should; “throw some gratuitous criticisms into a couple of opinions”; issue a few separate writings “question[ing the decision’s] premises” (ante, at 30); give the whole process a few years . . . and voila!—you have a justification for overruling the decision.

— Justice Kagan (dissenting) in LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO

— using an exclamation mark (the only one for the 2023-24 term) to register pointed incredulity

If he had any inclination to allow testing, he could have done that at any point during this litigation— for example, when Gutierrez filed his petition, when this Court granted review, at any point during the briefing process, before or after argument, or yesterday. Not only has he not done so, he has steadfastly maintained that he will not do so. His position is that this case should be dismissed!

— Justice Alito (dissenting) in GUTIERREZ v. SAENZ

— using an exclamation mark (the only one for the 2024-25 term) to signal emphatic disbelief

Rather, when the greatest wordsmith in modern Supreme Court history used the term to describe the relationship between two legal tests, he really meant (“more precisely” meant (!) that they merely overlapped—so that sometimes a person meeting one test necessarily meets the other, but then again, sometimes not.

— Justice Kagan (dissenting) in BROWN v. DAVENPORT

— using one of only two exclamation marks in the 2021–22 term (there were none in 2022–23), a rhetorical move to mock the majority’s pedantic correction

The majority says (and with this much we agree) that the answer to this question is no: In 1868, there was no nationwide right to end a pregnancy, and no thought that the Fourteenth Amendment provided one. Of course, the majority opinion refers as well to some later and earlier history. On the one side of 1868, it goes back as far as the 13th (the 13th!) century.

— Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan (dissenting) in DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

— using the second exclamation mark in the 2021-22 term to skewer the majority’s reliance on medieval precedent

B. L. posted the images to her Snapchat “story,” a feature of the application that allows any person in the user’s “friend” group (B. L. had about 250 “friends”) to view the images for a 24 hour period. The first image B. L. posted showed B. L. and a friend with middle fingers raised; it bore the caption: “Fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.” The second image was blank but for a caption, which read: “Love how me and [another student] get told we need a year of jv before we make varsity but tha[t] doesn’t matter to anyone else?” The caption also contained an upside-down smiley-face emoji.

— Justice Breyer in MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B.L.

— making the Court’s only reference to an emoji in a 2021-22 term opinion

In support of her hostile work environment claim, Pfannenstiel identifies five categories of acts supporting the existence of severe or pervasive sex-based harassment. The first category involves the following instant message exchange between Jones, the head of KHP, and Pfannenstiel in October of 2019: [10/10/2019 4:13 PM] [Jones] Getting our money's worth from you this week huh! [10/10/2019 4:13 PM] [Pfannenstiel] what an understatement (facepalm emoji) It's all good (thumbs up emoji) [Jones] Well at least I know you're not sleeping on the company's couch. (smiley with tongue hanging out emoji) )

— showing courts are called upon to interpret and describe emojis; this is one of several recent examples from a lower court, Pfannenstiel v. Kansas, No. 23-3145, 2024 WL 3534142, at *2 (10th Cir. July 25, 2024)